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Black Hawk and his redskin band, 
Was a terror in the land , 
Proud he was the Indian chief, 
Who could live on Mormon beef. 
F. Christensen 
PREFACE 
From 1865 until 1871 the Territory of Utah was the scene of a little-
known war. The Ute and Piute Indians responding to pressure of white 
settlers devastated much of Utah south of Spanish Fork. During the first 
three years of warfare the Mormon Settlements south of the Utah Valley 
struggled to exist. The next three years saw improving conditions but a 
continuation of raids by the Navaho in the south. 
This was a private war. Attempts to get government aid were futile. 
The settlers and the Mormon Church provided the men and equipment necessary. 
While the problems faced by the settlers were similar to those of all frontier 
areas they were compounded by remoteness and lack of preparation. 
Because of the oft repeated phrase attributed to Brigham Young, "It is 
cheaper to feed them than to fight them," little attention is given to the Indian 
problems. Indian troubles are lightly covered or ignored in the general belief 
that the Mormon settlers were able to develop cities and towns without Indian 
problems. Yet, in 1866 some 2, 500 men were under arms attempting to secure 
the Mormon frontier. 
It is hoped that this paper will hlep in completing the picture of this 
phase of Utah history. To those who guided and aided in the preparation I 
would like to express thanks and appreciation. 
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CHAPTER I 
MORMON-INDIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1865 
When the Mormons settled in the Salt Lake Valley they found that it 
was considered a no-man's land. The valley was an uninhabited area between 
lands occupied by the Shoshone Indians to the North and the Ute Indians to the 
South. 
The Ute Indians constituted one of the poorest tribes of Indians in 
America. The land they occupied was one of rugged mountains with short swift 
streams leading into arid deserts. The Ute struggled to survive in a land where 
even today man with his technical and scientific know-how often finds the winters 
severe. The Ute depended on all animals for food and gathered berries, grapes, 
roots, pinion nuts and fish. 1 In some areas he also harvested wild grass seed 
in the fall to supplement his diet. 
With the Mormon philosophy that each individual was to do all he could 
for himself as well as participate in the cooperative ventures of the community, 
an attempt was made to provide every man his own land. With thousands of 
families coming into the region every year it was necessary that new areas be 
explored for settlement. Exploration teams were sent in all directions from 
1s. Lymon Tyler, "Before Escalante: An Early History of the Yuta 
Indians" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of History, University 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1951), p. 34. 
2 
Salt Lake City seeking sites that were suitable for settlement. With the 
Mormon leadership interested in settling the good lands in the territory and 
with several good valleys within a short distance of Salt Lake City, it was not 
many years until settlements were established in them . 
The valleys suitable for settlement were also the homelands of the Ute 
Indians . With the Ute already having subsistance problems it was inevitable 
that the incuration of the Mormons would result in more problems. 
The Mormon policy proved to be not much different from that of the United 
States. In 1849 the first group of settlers to move into utah Valley south of Salt 
Lake City were stopped by a band of Timpanogoes Ute who showed concern about 
the large number of white settlers. The settlers were required to enter into a 
treaty that they would not drive the Indians from their lands nor deprive them of 
their rights. Dimick B. Huntington, the Indian interpreter, was required to seal 
the treaty by raising his right hand and swearing by the sun. Yet, the gradual 
increase of settlers had forced the Indians from the valley by 1865, except for a 
few who lived on the reservation farm at Spanish Fork. 2 
Brigham Young, while advising that every effort should be made to 
cultivate the friendship of the Indians, believed that the whites should definitely 
remain above them. His philosophy, as expressed is 1849, was "If you consider 
them your equals you cannot raise them up to you. " 3 In giving instructions to 
2
"History of Provo," Tullidge's Quarterly Magazine (July, 1884), 23. 
3History of Brigham Young, Ms. , May, 1849, pp. 76-77, quoted in 
B. H. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints (6 Vols., Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret News Press, 1930), 
Vol. Ill, p. 458. 
the colonists at Fort Utah on Octobe r 18, 1849 , he said: 
Tend to your own affairs , and let the Indians take care of 
themselves. Let your women and children stay in the fort, and 
the Indians stay out; but, while you mix with them promiscuously, 
you must continue to receive such treatment from them which they 
please to give . . . be familiar with the Indians and they will be 
more familiar; and the more familiar, you will find the less influ-
ence you will have with them. If you would have dominion over 4 
them, for their good . you must not treat them as your equals . 
3 
Young had no illusions ahout the Indians. He knew it would take years 
to teach them the ways of the white people. He also knew that if the two peoples 
were to exist side by side relations had to be good between them. He urged the 
Mormons to do what they could to feed and clothe the Indians. He expressed the 
feeling that more lives would be saved by feeding and clothing the Indians than 
through military pressure. 5 Travelers in the territory during the late 1870's 
a nd early 1880's expressed the feeling that they traveled in safety because of 
the good relationships between the two peoples. One traveler said, "The 
Mormon policy became, it is cheaper to feed them than to fight them. "6 Young 
wanted the Indians kept in their place , and felt that trouble could be avoided if 
caution were used. 
4Ibid . , p. 458. 
5Journal of Discourses, Vol. X, p. 108. 
6Phil Robinson, Saints and Sinners (Boston, Massachusetts: Roberts 
Brothers Press, 1883) , p. 126. This was expressed by Robinson after he 
trave led the Utah Territory as being the policy of the settlers . 
4 
Relations between whites and Ute were often strained. The white men 
had driven many Indian groups to new fishing locations by the darning and 
diverting of streams. The white man had fenced meadows and plowed the 
fertile areas that provided much of the berry and root food supply of the Indians. 
The white man also introduced cattle and sheep into the area. They spread over 
the unfenced areas eating the grass and driving the wild animals higher into the 
mountains. The sheep and cattle ate the grass that provided the winter supply 
of seed. Food was usually scarce for the Indian and he found it becoming more 
scarce as the increasing number of settlers spread, and fe nced the new land. 
The white man's cattle, horses and sheep looked like a better way of life for 
the destitute Indian. As early as 1850 an Indian agent accused the Mormons of 
causing the problems by taking the best lands . 
The white man , not knowing, or caring, was doing the same thing that 
other Indi an tribes had faced everywhere white men settled. Indian removal 
was not a stated policy until the elimination of the Indian farms at Spanish Fork 
and Twelve Mile Creek in the 1860's. Nevertheless, the practice of pushing 
the Indians into the remote areas was a de facto removal policy. The white 
settlers saw good land going to waste and were determined to utilize it. The 
Indian Agency in the Utah Territory appeared to be concerned only with keep-
ing the Indians pacified. 
The ute, finding that the semi-domesticated cattle and sheep were 
easier to kill than wild animals, often killed for food. Within the white man's 
concept of "thou shalt not steal" this became a crime that had to be punished . 
5 
Many white settlers were nearly destitute themselves and could not afford 
the loss of livestock. Both sides had problems and nothing was done to help 
either. Most Indian troubles in Utah resulted from livestock theft . 
Military force was used several times against the Indians before 1865. 
The only prolonged difficulties however, were those in connection with the 
Walker War, 1853-54. 7 
One attempt to upgrade the Indian was that of the Indian farm. Follow-
ing the council of Governor Young, five small reservations were established 
in the counties of Utah, Juab, Sanpete, Millard, and Iron. 8 These reservations 
became known as Indian farms because some attempts were made to teach the 
Indians farming and ways of a sedentary life. 
With the arrival of Johnston's army in 1858 the farms were neglected 
and allowed to deteriorate. As settlers increased in the Sanpete and Utah 
County area, pressure was applied to the Indian Agency to close the Spanish 
Fork and Twelve Mile Creek areas and turn them over to settlers. In May, 
1860, the Federal Government appropriated $53, 000 to pay for past Indian 
agents and costs of surveying and mapping the farms. 9 The farms existed 
until a treaty between the Indians and Government was negotiated in June, 
7 Gustive 0. Larson, Outline History of Utah and the Mormons 
(Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Company, 1958), p. 149. 
8Names of these farms were: Spanish Fork, Utah Co.; Corn Creek, 
Millard Co. ; Twelve Mile Creek, Sanpete Co. ; Deep Creek, Tooele Co. ; 
Pinto, Iron Co. 
9 Gustive 0. Larson, p. 152. 
1865, when the Ute gave up the two farms for the Uintah Reservation. 
Ute-Indian Relations 
While Indian problems continued to increase within the Mormon settle-
ments, events were shaping on the Western plains that may have contributed to 
further difficulty. The start of the Civil War drew from the plains the best of 
the military units. Indian problems were largely ignored during the war, but 
efforts were made shortly after its conclusion to solve them. The Ute who 
ranged over Colorado and Eastern Utah had communication with the Plains 
Indians. 10 Military actions against the Plains Indians and the losses suffered 
by the Indians may have added to the belligerence of Black Hawk and other 
braves who were not happy with the concilitory policies of their leaders. Surely 
the Ute and Navaho knew of the Sand Creek Massacre. 
One of the major problems with the Indians during this period was the 
indecisiveness of the U.S. Government concerning Indians . Control over the 
Indians was shifted from one governmental department to the other. Frontier 
officers often never knew what the policy toward the Indians would be . The 
Government defaulted on several treaties. Payments were not made or agree-
ments live up to. Chief Spotted Tail of the Sioux said, "All men from Wash-
ington are liars. " 11 
10Rex Curry, Administrative Officer, Ute Indian Tribe, Fort 
Duchesne , Utah, "Background History of the Ute Tribe," Manuscript in this 
writer's possession. n. d. (Typewritten) 
11Fairfax Downey, Indian Fighting Army (New York: Bantam Books, 
1957), p. 37. 
Perhaps during the 1860's the greatest Indian leaders of the plains 
developed. The plains saw Indians win major victories. The defeat of 
Captain W. B. Fetterman and his company by Crazy Horse on December 21, 
1866, could have furnished example to al l Indians and increased the hos tility 
of the Ute. 
With the Indian troubles on the plains it is understandable that the 
Utah settlers could not get federal aid when they asked for it. The United 
States was sti ll suffering from the effects of the Civil War. Debts were high 
and people in the East had their own problems. People who lived in the remote 
mountains of the West were largely forgotten by the states. 
Relations between the Ute and other Indians were good enough that 
when the Ute began to raid the Mormon settlements, Navaho braves soon came 
to get in on the spoils. 12 The Navaho also began to raid settlements in 
Southern Utah during this period. There are accounts of some Piede and 
Pavan Indians aiding the Navaho in the Southern part of the territory. Most 
of the Piede and Pavan Indians, however, remained neutral or aided the 
settlers. There are no accounts of other Indians becoming involved in the war. 
Events Leading to War 
In 1849 Chief Walker of the Ute tribe visited Brigham Young in Salt 
12
F. H. Head, Indian Commissioner, Utah Territory, Letter to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, April 30, 1866. Indian Affairs Reports 1865-71 
(Microfilm copy at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah). 
8 
Lake City. During thi s visit he asked that settlers be sent to the Sanpete 
region to establish farms and show the Indians how to become farmers . The 
first settlers were called to this region in the fall of 1849. 13 
Relations between whites and Indians in the Sanpete region had been 
good from the year 1849 to the winter of 1864-65. There had been thefts of 
livestock but no serious problems had erupted. The Mormons made periodic 
gifts of flour and livestock but no serious attempts were made to civilize the 
Indians. 
The winter of 1864-65 was a bad one for the band of Ute Indians camped 
near Gunnison on the Sevier River. The winter was severe and food was scarce. 
Indians of the band killed some of the settler's livestock for food. During the 
winter an epidemic of smallpox or measles swept Indian camps killing many. 14 
Some of the spiritual leaders of the Indians began to blame the Mormons for the 
disease. 15 With the blame placed on the Mormons for their problems the 
Indians began to boast about what they planned to do to the Mormons when spring 
came. Mormon leaders , unfortunately, shrugged off such warnings as being 
incidental. 16 
both. 
13Roberts, Comprehensive History of the Church, III, p . 461. 
14Both diseases are found in sources; evidence is about equal for 
15Peter Gottfredson, History of Indian Depredations in Utah (Salt 
Lake City, Utah: Skelton Publishing Co., 1909), pp. 129. 336. 
16Ibid., p. 334. 
9 
By early spring the problem had grown until local leaders were seek-
ing solutions. It was felt that a treaty could be concluded with the Indians and 
that the problem could be solved peaceably. Arrangements were made for a 
meeting in Manti, April 9, 1865. The meeting at the home of Jerome Kempton 
was almost successful and most of the problems seemed on the verge of being 
solved when negotiations were interupted . 
A group of interested whites and Indians had gathered in the front 
yard of the Kempton home to learn what they could about the proceedings, and 
tempers were high. Many whites were angry over livestock that had been stolen. 
Indians felt that they were being cheated and robbed by the whites . One of the 
young Indians, a Sub-Chief Yenewood (also known as Jake Arropine), began to 
argue and arouse the Indi ans. John Lowry, one of the whites who had lost cattle 
to the Indians , attempted to pacify Yenewood. Yenewood and Lowry began to 
quarrel. George W. Bean , an interpreter and prominent citizen later stated 
that the Black Hawk War was caused by John Lowry. Bean claimed that Lowry 
(a drunked interpreter) claimed a horse an Indian had and knocked him down and 
beat him. Bean went on to say, "our Indian troubles have general ly been brought 
about by some foolish act of the white men. "17 
One of Lowry's friends shouted a warning that Yenewood was drawing 
an arrow. Lowry went to Yenewood's horse to prevent the arrow from being 
drawn and in the skirmish Yenewood was pulled from his horse and struck. 
17 George W. Bean. Dictation. H. H. Bancroft Papers , University of 
California at Berkeley. (Microfilm Copy , Utah State University, Logan, Utah), 
Reel 2. 
10 
Seeing Yenewood attacked the other Indians came to his aid. Breaking off 
negotiations , the Indians returned to their camps to spread the word. Think-
ing whites began to prepare for the trouble they could expect. 
Thus with years of misunderstanding and ignorance on both sides the 
stage was set for the worst Indian war in Utah history. Most accounts blame 
Lowry for the start of the war. Lowry did not deny his part in the war but 
defended himself in a statement at a reunion of Black Hawk War veterans at 
Manti. Peter Gottfredson later reproduced a signed copy of the statement: 
The occasion of the present re-union being opportune , in order 
to correct an erroneous impression that has become wide-spread as 
to what precipated the Black-Hawk War . I take this opportunity or 
means of placing the facts before the world. 
But first let me state that I came here as a pioneer, and took 
part in the first battle fought with the Indians under command of Col. 
John Scott. And I have in one way or another been associated with 
almost every Indian trouble in the early history of this region. I 
served as Indian interpre te r for years in Manti, and have passed 
through many close places in dealing with the Red Men. 
~rnl.864 a small band of Indians were wintering at Gunnison, 
many of them died , and they found r eason for their trouble in con-
clusion that the Mormons had written their names and sent them to 
satan , and he had caused death to come upon them. So in the ir 
councils they were directed by their Chief to stop the sickness among 
them by killing (Mormons) in retaliation. In February, Black Hawk 
informed me what the Indians were going to do when the snow went 
off. They would kill Mormons and eat Mormon beef. I immediately 
went to my Bishop with the information. He thought, as did many 
others that it was just Indian talk and amounted to nothing ; but the 
Indians told me several times what they intended to do, and so I 
went the second time to the Bishop. My story was received by him 
saying "there are not enough of the m . " 
ShoJtlY after I learned they were killing cattle. I had some 
cattle on the range myself , and in my search for them I found the 
skull of an ox which I had owned ... I had always been a friend to 
them, as had the Mormon people. I talked to them in such a way 
that they agreed to pay me for the animal which had been killed by 
fetching me a horse , and they did so the next day. I agreed to meet 
with tham at Manti about the eighth of April and talk the matter over 
of their killing our cattle . Accordingly the council took place. 
It appeared the difficulty would be settled amicably, but a 
certain young Indian present whose father had died during the 
winter continued to halloo and make demonstrations, saying 
that he would eat Mormon beef and kill Mormons when the snow 
went off. I told him a time or two to stop and permit me to 
finish my talk. Just them someone called "lookout, he is getting 
his arrows." I rode up to him and turned him off his horse, and 
pulled him to the ground. The bystanders interferred and we 
were separated . . In those days it was at times imperative 
that harsh measures should be used . . It was a question of 
supermacy between the whitemen and the Indian. I have patiently 
born the stigma placed upon me , for I knew the facts, and to 
those who still persist in looking upon me as guilty of precipitating 
the Black Hawk War , I will say this , that I appeal from their 
decision to a higher court--our creator, who will ultimately judge 
all men. 
s / John Lowry 
8 Stamped with the Commissioners of Indian War Records Seal. 1 
18Gottfredson, p. 335. 
11 
12 
CHAPTER II 
THE WAR 
Indians Involved 
With the misunderstandings between the Mormon and the Ute at a 
combustible point the more aggressive Indian leaders began to gain in influ-
ence. The friendly relations between the Mormons and the Indian leaders 
caused some young braves to resent Indian leadership. The Mormons, while 
having good relationships with the chiefs , ignored the young hot bloods. Be-
cause of this relationship the Mormons were not prepared for hostilities. The 
state of prepardness in Mormon settlements appears to have been very low. 
At the time of the outbreak of hostilities the Ute Indians were governed 
by four chieftans and several sub-chiefs. At the final negotiations at the 
Spanish Fork Indian Farm when the Indians gave up all land but the Uintah 
Basin Reservation all four chiefs and 15 sub-chiefs signed the agreement. 1 
Of the chiefs, Kanosh, Sowiette, San Pitch, and Tabby, only San Pitch was 
to participate in the war. Several of the sub-chieftans became leaders of war 
parties. Black Hawk, for whom the war was named, was not present at this 
conference, He probably did not rank high enough to sign an agreement of 
1
neseret News, June 14, 1865. 
13 
this kind . With Chief Tabby leading the way, most of the Indians moved onto 
the reservation where they stayed throughout the war years. Most of the 
warriors to participate in the war were young men unhappy with the Mormons 
and their Indian leaders . 
Black Hawk, the sub-chief who became the principle War Chief, was 
thought to be a Pah-Ute (Piute) . 2 He was born in the Southern part of Utah 
Valley, and as a youth played with the white c hildren of the area. Black Hawk 
spoke English fluently as a result of his early association with the whites. His 
fa ther was Synnap Pich or Tenaciono (s omething tha t hangs on). C. L. 
Christensen, an Indian interpreter , stated the Synnap Pich was a chief of the 
Sanpete ar ea. His mother was Tanar-oh-wich (mother of boys ). 3 
Black Hawk has been described as be ing tall and s tately. He supposedly 
4 
had a long nose and looked as though he had a small mustache. Black Hawk was 
intelligent and could make up his mind in a hurry. It was said that more than 
once as a youth he sat in Mormon meetings and listened to them plan defense 
against the Indians. 
Black Hawk showed evidence of having traits of strong conscience and 
loyalty. One man, Soren A. Sorensen, near Ephriam in 1867 was asked why 
2Josiah F . Gibbs, "Black Hawk's Last Raid," Utah Historical 
Quarterly , IV (October, 1931), 484 . 
3c. L. Christensen, Deseret News, September 29, 1919 . 
4 
Mary Goble Pay , Cited by Kate B. Carter, Our Pioneer Heritage 
(Salt Lake City, Utah: Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 1966) , p . 247. 
14 
Black Hawk had let him live but killed people within sight, said, "I cannot say 
why, unless it was owing to the fact that when I was home with my parents, 
my mother took a liking to the young Indian Black Hawk. "5 
Black Hawk was wounded at the battle of Gravelly Ford in June of 
1866. His active participation in the war seems to have stopped them. August 
of 1867 found him on the reservation still suffering from his wound . Those who 
saw him in the last months of his life attributed his death to tuberculosis caused 
by his wound. 6 
In 1869 Black Hawk, a sick man, appeared in Fillmore during a 
Sacrament meeting and asked Bishop Callister if he could address the congregation. 
When given permission, he stood to one side of the pulpit and asked forgiveness 
for the damage he had done. He had gotten permission from military authorities 
to visit each town. With an escort of seven or eight warriors, Black Hawk 
visited every town between Cedar City and Payson, and made peace with the 
people. He was often provided an escort by citizens from town to town. 7 
Black Hawk appeared at Parowan where he was met with the town's band, 
and it was said that he was very pleased. He also appeared at Holden, Fountain 
Green and Spring City. From reports of residents of these areas Black Hawk 
5 
Gottfredson, p. 172. 
6This seems unreasonable in relation to our knowledge of tuberculosis 
causes today. 
7Gottfredson, p. 228 . See also Deseret News, October 6, 1934. 
15 
was ve r y ill. He had lost considerably weight and was in pain. 8 
Black Hawk 's last days were spent near Spring Lake, Utah. He died 
there on September 26, 187 0, and was buried in the foothills east of Santaquin, 
Utah. 9 An artic le in the Deseret News, October 6 , 1934 , states that workers 
in a nearby cane field saw Ute Indians carry Black Hawk's body from his tent 
and place it on a horse. The burial party moved into the foothills east of 
Santaquin. 10 
Black Hawk could not have been very old at the time of his death . If 
he played with Mormon boys as a youth he could not have been much over ten 
when the Mormons first settled the area. Any Indian boy ove r that age probably 
would not have time to play. If his association began in 1849 , when the Mormons 
first settled Utah or Sanpete Counties, he would have been at the most twenty-
five or thirty at the outbreak of the war and no older than his middle thirites 
at the time of his death . The active daring type of campaigns he led testify 
that he must have been young, not only in actions and deed, but in age. Black 
Hawk was survived by three wives. There is no evidence indicating descendants . 
The Ute tribe has no records earlier than 1947, due to fire. 
Black Hawk was replaced as war chief by White Horse (Shi-Nav-Egin). 
White Horse was given his name by white settlers because he always preferred 
white horses . White Horse led many of the raids after Black Hawk was forced 
8
neseret News , October 6, 1934. 
9Ibid., Septembe r 20, 1919 . 
10Ibid. , October 6, 1934. 
to retire . 11 White Horse died at the Hatch ranch in Grass Valley about the 
year 19 00. 12 
16 
The Piute , a southern branch of the Ute, were also active during the 
war . A meeting was held in Circleville April 21, 1866, at which time the 
people were informed that the Piute, Ute, Piede, Pavan, and Navaho tribes 
had united for the war. 13 While Piute actions were few in number , evidence 
suggests that warriors from the tribe were prominent in the r aids of the Utes 
farther North. Most of the Piede and Pavan Indians stayed friendly to the 
whites and proved valuable allies in tracking and recovering stolen stock in 
Southern Utah. 
The Navaho, whose homeland encompasses the Arizona, New Mexico , 
Southern Utah and Colorado area had raided the Northern Indi ans for slaves 
before the white settler came. Now, with an opportunity to participate in raids 
against the whites, they became moderately active. The first evidence that they 
were allied with the Ute came from Indian Agent F. H. Head of the Utah 
Territory. In a letter to Commissioner D. N. Cooley in Washington, Head 
wrote; 
"Sil': 
"Black Hawk, a somewhat prominent chief of the Ute Indians, 
has been engaged for more than a year past in active hostilities 
11Ibid. See also Gottfredson, supplement, p . 3. 
12Gottfredson, supplement, p . 3. 
13Hilda Madsen Longdorf, Mt. Pleasant 1859-1939 (Salt Lake City , 
Utah: Stevens and Wallis, Inc., 1939) , p . 108. 
against the settlements in the southern portion of the territory. 
His band consisted at first of but forty four men, who were 
mostly outlaws and desperate characters from his own and 
other tribes. During the summer and autumn of 1865 he made 
several successful forays upon the weak and unprotected settle-
ments in Sanpete and Seviere Counties. Killing in all thirty two 
whites . . forty of his warriors were killed. . On the 
20th instant he again commenced his depredations .. . his band 
from what I consider entirely reliable information, now numbers 
about one hundred warriors, one-half of whom are Navahos from 
New Mexico. 14 
17 
In Southern Utah almost all of the Indian activities were by the Navaho, 
wr.o began their raids in January of 1866 and continued until 1871. Navaho actions 
continued unilaterally after the Utes withdrew from hostilities in 1868. While 
their raids were usually small and limited in damage they succeeded in supsetting 
the Southern border area for several years. 
The White Militia 
The main defensive force during the war was the Nauvoo Legion, which 
had its beginning when the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints was 
located in Nauvoo, illinois. After the move to Utah the legion was soon active 
in iefense of the territory. At the outbreak of the Black Hawk troubles, when 
the U.S. Government refused aid, the legion became by default the instrument 
by which people defended their homes . The Nauvoo Legion served throughout 
the Black Hawk hostilities but most of the time it was a makeshift army serving 
wih poor weapons and without pay. 
14 F. H. Head, Indian Affairs Reports, April 30, 1966. 
18 
The Legion was the only military force in Utah from 1847 until 
Thited States troops settled Camp Floyd . During this period the Territory 
ststained sporadic Indian attacks and the Walker War . Indian troubles forced 
t•rritorial officers to keep some of the militia on reserve . As the population 
o the area increased the Indian activities moved to the more sparsely settled 
atd remote areas of the territory. Especially hard hit were the ranching areas. 
It was easy for the Indians to r a id horse and cattle herds and effect escape. 
Gten the Indians would be mile s and days away before the animals were missed 
o· enough men could be gathered to offer effective pursuit. 
With the advent of federal territorial officers, any mustering and drill-
itS of local militia units were forbidden. Federal officers preferred to place 
tbir confidence in federal troops stationed at Camp Floyd and later at Fork 
Douglas . Any attempt to muster the militia was met with suspicion and hos-
tiity . 
The Legion eventually became essentially a social organization. Often 
C.urch of civic leaders were elected officers of the Legion for prestige or 
scial reasons. When trouble did cause the use of the Legion many of the 
oficers who had been promoted simply for social reasons , were not the type 
n•eded for active participation in a war. At the start of the war military units 
hal to be mustered and equipped before action could be taken. This lack of 
prpardness cost the settlers in lives and livestock. 
Under the Territorial law in the 1860's the Governor was the Supreme 
Ccrnmander of the militia . In this respect the militia of the 1860's can be 
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compared with the National Guard of today. Since the Governor was a federal 
appointee, serious problems could have been caused by his lack of co-operation. 
Both Governor Duane Doty and Charles Durkee co-operated as best as they 
could with the militia officials . No Governor except Brigham Young up to that 
time ever acted as the commander and authority rested in the elected Lieutenant 
General. During the war period this continued to be Daniel H. Wells. 
The Territory of Utah was divided into military districts with a General 
Officer in command of each. The make up of the local military units depended 
upon the number of people in each district. 15 
The military commanders of the Sanpete District during this war were 
General Warren K. Snow and General William B. Pace, who replaced Snow in 
1867 . General Erastus Snow commanded the Iron County district in Southern 
Utah. 
General Warren Snow, the first General to become involved, was not 
a young man. While he was active he proved to be overly cautious. He scored 
one significant victory over the Indians at Fish Lake in the year-and-a-half he 
commanded the Sanpete region. He served well in organizing companies and 
guard units for local protection but he was not the vigorous leader the area 
needed at the time. General Snow was replaced by General William B. Pace in 
April of 1867. The only reason shown for General Snow's replacement was 
health. He was wounded in 1865, and did get out of a sick bed at Glenwood in 
15J. Cecil Alter, ed. , "The State of Deseret," Utah Historical 
Quarterly, Vill (April, 1940), 77-78. 
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March of 1867, to organize a pursuit . He was cautious in several instances 
and may have provoked mutinous feelings in his officers. Certainly the General 
was no coward. 
General Pace had been active in the Nauvoo Legion since the age of 15 . 16 
He authored one book on military tactics in 1865. General Pace let at least 
one victory slip from his hands. The Gravelly Ford incident indicated that he 
was also cautious. The fact that his men were not able to kill any Indians in 
this battle and yet exhaust their ammunition suggests that his men were not well 
trained. By the time of this battle , June 10, 1866, the war was one year old . 
Surely leaders could have found time to train men in the effective use of fire-
arms. 
In the Southern end of the territory the situation was quite different. 
General Erastus Snow took command instantly and began effective actions. 
While he did not participate in any expeditions he did provide able leaders. 
General Snow advanced two very capable men, Colonel James Andrus and 
Colonel J.D. L. Pierce, from Captains because of their successful leadership 
and achievements in defeating Indians and recovering stolen animals. 
Every able man in the war area served in some capacity during hos-
tilities. Young men served in the cavalry or infantry and men over forty-five 
served in the Silver-Greys, or home guard. Each man was responsible for 
16William B. Pace, "Autobiography," Brigham Young University, 
Provo, Utah. (Typewritten. ) 
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his own weapons, and this meant that there were many different types of 
weapons and ammunition. Rifles ranged from the modern cap and ball to the 
musket of years earlier. Each man furnished his own gear; if cavalry , his 
horse and saddle. 
During 1866 militia actions and defensive measures taken by the settle-
ments proved to be so effective that the war degenerated into small r a ids on 
livestock herds and travelers . By 1867-68 the tide has turned and the militia 
and defenses began to cost the Indians more than they gained; they began to 
lose most of the stock stolen and suffer greater losses of men. 
Even though Indian depredations continued in parts of the territory 
after 1870, Governor J. W. Shaffer refused to allow further musters of the 
militia or drills. All military units were to be withdrawn and official actions 
ceased on this date . 
Prompt effective action in the south held the raids to a minimum while 
amateurish efforts in the north in 1865 only served to encourage the Indians. 
It was not until after serious effor ts in 1866 that depredations in the north 
slackened . 
The first military action came from Mt. Pleasant. After receiving 
word of the Indian raid at Twelve Mile Creek, militia units were organized 
that functioned as long as there was a threat to the area. 
General Snow as the district commander and his most active subordinate 
Colonel Reddick Allred were both active leaders. Colonel Allred served until 
the end of hostilities . 
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In a reorganization of the Legion at Mr. Pleasant on July 15, 1865 , 
two companies of cavalry were organized and one of home guard. Capta in 
Lauritz La r son was made commander of A Company, Jacob Christensen Captain 
of B Company and Captain John Tidwell was made the commander of the Home 
Guard (Silve r-Greys) comprised of o lder men. On October 3, on the advice of 
President Young, the Mt. Pleasant unit was deactivated . This move was pre -
matu re and the unit was called to duty on the 17th of the month to pursue Indians 
who had success full y gotten away with over 20 0 head of ca ttle. 
In the year 1866 the militia units of central Utah served under the 
command of General Wells who moved south to conduct the campaigns. The men 
of the centra l part of the territory had the double problem of serving with the 
militia and taking care of their homes and farms at the same time . Whe n they 
were not pursuing Indians some were standing guard while the others worked 
in the ir fields. This group of men must be c lassed as minutemen while those 
who came from the Salt Lake r egion could be classified as mili tary units . 
There are no records of a id given by ·the Northern part of the territory 
for the year 1865. When it became evident tha t Indian problems were going to 
continue in 1866 , men and equipment were soon on their way from the Sa lt La ke 
region. The first units to reach the be leagued area arrived May 5. They were 
us ed to provide guards for se ttlers abandoning their homes on the Upper Sevier 
River. 17 By the first of June , military units had arrived from Utah , Sa lt La ke 
17 Gottfredson, p . 199. 
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and Davis Counties. Reinforcements moved into the central area until October 
of the year, the last company arriving was that of Captain Robert Davis of 
Kaysville . The last company of Northern militia to return home was tha t of 
Colonel John Sharp who reached Salt Lake City in early November, 1866. 
Northern units were involved in several major battles and proved as e ffective 
as any units in the field. Efforts this year were to be the biggest of the war. 
Be fore the years end some 2, 500 men had been involved against an estimated 
force of 300 Indians . 
Northern aid came earlier the next year. On April 15, 1867, General 
Wells called upon General Robert T. Burton of the Salt Lake district to raise 
three platoons of cavalry , seventy-two men, to march for Sanpete on the 22nd, 
under Captain Orson P. Miles. 18 On May 22, Captain William L. Binder and 
a small company of infantry reported to General Pace. Captain Binde r and his 
company spent most of the time they we r e in the area working on the never 
finished Fort Gunnison. 
Men· and supplies continued to be sent from the North but in smaller 
numbers as the Indian attacks diminished. By 1868 the war had degene r ated 
into small raids on livestock that were considered normal and the war for all 
practical purposes considered over . Without the contribution of the Northern 
area it is likely that the Central part of the territory would have been abandoned 
to the Indians. 
18H. H. Bancroft, History of Utah (San Francisco, California: The 
History Company Publishers, 1890) , p. 206. 
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The major problem of the militia was that of supply. Ammunition 
was scarce and dependable weapons in short supply. The area in which most 
of the hostilities took place was remote from any large center of commerce. 
Military units going into the field were often limited in supplies of all kinds . 
The Indians had reduced the horse herd so that pack animals were often not 
available, the men had to depend on what they could carry . Several times the 
militia were reduced to dry crackers and water during a campaign. 19 New 
supplies were days away and often the smallest item loomed large in impor-
tance. George W. Bean, Quartermaster of the Sanpete region had to request 
horseshoes and horseshoe nails more than once . One message in June of 
1867 asked that they be hurried because there were now south of Salt Lake City . 20 
Supplies of this kind could have and should have been stored during the winter 
months. 
At the start of the war the settlers gathered what lead they could find 
and made bullets of the different sizes needed . As is shown in a statement of 
Josiah Sylvester ammunition was often scarce and little could be wasted. 
I was out of ammunition and was informed that Elijah B. Ward 
had been seen moulding bullets for his pistol, which was the size 
I wanted. Someone went with me to get them. It was dark and we 
19Robert Bodily, "Autobiography," Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (Typewritten.) 
20George W. Bean, Memo to General Burton, Military Records, 
Territorial Militia-Nauvoo Legion correspondence. Utah State Archives. 
1859-75, box 6. 
had no light. As Ward ' s corpse was laid out on the trunk or chest, 
we had to raise him up, while I searched for the bullets until I 
found them. 21 
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One problem that faced not only the men in the field but those who tried 
to furnish supplies was money. Most of the men served throughout the war 
without pay. General Pace later commented that he never received a penny 
for his three years service during the• Blake Hawk War. 22 The State Legis,-
lature seemed inclined to ignore the war in their appropriations of 1866-67 . 
Military appropr iations for these two years were $1, 016. 36 for supplies and 
$3,000 to furnish the office of the Adjutant General. 23 This meant that every-
thing e lse used had to be furnished by the Church, settlement, or the men 
involved. The people of Ephraim were taxed over $6 ,000 just to maintain 
guards during the war. One citizen of Mt. Pleasant stated: 
My portion was $75 . 00 a year. Some men could not fit them-
se lves out and we were ordered to let them have articles they could 
use and receive credit for them. Besides the assessment I furnished 
a horse, bridle and saddle , kept them on hand for them, a long with 
one Ballard rifle, and one cap and ball pistol, others did likewise . 24 
The supply problem was exclusively that of the territory. Attempts to get aid 
21 Josiah Sylvester, "Autobiography," Utah State Archives, Territorial 
papers , 1864-69, box 3, p. 1. 
22Wil liam B. Pace. 
23
utah Legislative Record, 1866 -67 . Microfilm , Utah State University 
Library , Logan, Utah, p . 2. 
24
Andrew Madsen, Journal cited by Longdorf, p. 98 . 
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from the Federal Government were futile. 
The people of Utah, not being militant in nature, had not placed great 
emphasis on firearms; as a result, the war found many men to be poorly armed 
and in a situation where this lack could not be easily remedied. 
The leaders of Utah, knowing the territory could not afford a war and 
did not have a trained army, looked for help. After the first Indian attack in 
the Mt. Pleasant area local officials appea led to Colonel 0. H. Irish, the Indian 
Agent. Colonel Irish appealed to Colonel Patrick Connor, the commander of 
the California Volunteers who were stationed at Fort Douglas, near Salt Lake 
City. Colonel Connor replied that if the deprediations were committed upon 
settlements remote from the mail line he cou ld not furnish help. The Colonel 
has come in for much criticism because of his stand. Perhaps critics have 
been too harsh. A military man who had order could not completely ignore 
them. The Indian raids were far enough from the major East-West mail 
rou tes that his men would have been gone for weeks. 
In the spring of 1866 Colonel F. H. Head, the new Indian Agent, called 
again on the new commander at the fort for aid. Colonel Potter wired east for 
instructions. General Dodge at Fort Leavenworth sent this reply May 2, 1866. 
General Pope telegraphs that the superintendent of Indian 
affairs will have to depend for2 the present on the militia to 
compel the Indians to behave. 5 
General Pope's reply to Colonel Head's request sealed the matter of 
25F. H. Head , Indian Affairs Reports, May 2, 1866. 
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federal aid . No further appeals were made to the Government for men. There 
is nothing to indicate that the militia sought material from the government in 
the form of weapons or ammunition. 
Types of Warfare 
The type of warfare used by the Ute during the war was almost 
exclusively hit and run. There is only one account of Indians attacking a 
fixed position. The Indians did not attempt to attack the larger settlements. 
The settlements that were attacked were small and isolated and were limited 
to attempts to steal the livestock. Targets for Indian attacks were always 
livestock. Because of the large amounts of feed needed for the livestock the 
animals were grouped together and hereded by assigned men or boys. 26 These 
herds became the primary targets of the Indians and usually the few herders 
the victims. More than once the Indians attacked and escaped with herds of 
over 200 animals. Because of the remoteness of the herd or lack of organized 
pursuit the Indians were often days and many miles away from the scene before 
organized pursuit was possible. 
During 1865 and the first part of 1866 almost every Indian raid was 
successful. Indians would scout a promising area and lay in wait until the 
opportunity came for a raid. As late as 1867 they were still using the same 
tactics. A memo to General Wells from General Pace, July 17, 1867, stated: 
26Ina G. Johnson, "Biography of Fritz Leonard Johnson:• Utah 
Historical Society, Salt Lake City, Utah, p. 10. 
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"All quiet but signs of Indian spies in the hills daily. "27 
There were three definite tactics used successfully by the Ute . The 
first was used during a successful raid . A few of the Indians would continue 
to drive the stolen animals while the rest prepared an ambush for the pursuing 
militia. This technique worked well enough that very few stolen animals were 
ever recovered. Usually the militia would draw off because of darkness or 
being outnumbered and short of ammunition, and the Indians would easily 
escape . 
The Indians used this tactic on their first raid and it was so successful 
they used it everytime an opportunity arose. The frustration of constant Indian 
success can be summed up by Josiah S. Sylvester's statement: 
That was the way it was all the time. The Indians would sit 
on the mountains and see where our stock were and what we were 
doing and making a dash would kill people that were at work in the 
fields or traveling the road , rush their stock into the mountains , 
leaving some to drive them on whi le others fell back and waited in 
ambush on the trail for those who pursued. We hardly ever met 
them without them having the advantage. 28 
A second tactic was one used when the raid was unsuccessful or pur-
suit getting too close. The Indians would divide their party into several small 
groups and each group take a different route to their destination . Most militia 
commanders would halt their pursuit and turn back rather than spend time 
tracking just a few Indians or risking the threat of dividing their commands 
27General William B . Pace, Military Records , box 6 . 
28Sylvester, p . 5. 
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and being ambushed. Often the Indians would kill or cripple the slow or hard 
to manage livestock before conceding defeat and dividing into groups for 
escape . 
The third tactic used repeatedly was that of attacking travelers. Single 
wagons or small groups were game for the Indians. Several people were killed 
and many wounded attempting to travel without proper protection. 
Until the militia was able to provide enough pressure in 1866 and 1867 
to make the raids costly the Indians had things their own way. With the increased 
number of militia units and more forceful pursuit the Indians were forced on the 
defensive and eventually into inactivity. 
Militia field tactics were based on standard military theory of the 
period. Cavalry units were assigned to settlements prone to attack and stayed 
ready to pursue at a moments notice . But, because of the distances and slow 
communication,these units were usually ineffective. 
Major Conflicts 
The first meeting between the militia and the Indians came about after 
t raid on the Twelve Mile Creek Indian Farm. A group of Mormons had gone 
:o gather their cattle from the farm the day after the Manti talks of May 10 , 
1865 . Black Hawk, leading a small group of warriors , successfully ambushed 
he Mormons, killed one and escaped with the cattle. 29 
29
neseret News , July 14 , 1914 . 
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Black Hawk led his band south to the Salina area where they joined with 
Indians from the Richfield area. After gathering more cattle the Indians moved 
into Salina Canyon and Eastern Utah. While moving through Salina Canyon the y 
met and killed two settlers who were unaware of Indian problems . 30 
On May 12, a militia unit of 84 me n under Colonel Reddick Allred began 
the pursuit. About ten miles up Salina Canyon the militia was ambushed when 
passing through a narrow section in single file. Surprised , untrained , and in a 
difficult position the men retreated leaving two dead . 31 
On May 14, the reinforced militia again entered the canyon where they 
recovered the bodies of their fallen companions. They continued to follow the 
Indians into the mountains be tween Fish Lake and the Colorado River, where 
they caught up with Black Hawk's party. A battle ensued and several Indians 
were reported killed. The Indi ans were never the less able to get away with all 
of the stolen livestock , and the militia returned home empty handed. 
The Indians struck next at a ranch in Thistle Valley. At daybreak on 
May 24, they killed and mutila ted a sleeping family consisting of John Givin , 
his wife and four children. Two employees of Givin escaped because they were 
sleeping in a wagon box away from the cabin and had the wisdom to keep quiet 
when awakened by screams. After the Indians gathered their plunder and 
escaped the two men went for help . 
30Longdorf, p. 95. 
31
sylvester, p. 2. 
31 
In an action they often repeated the Indians killed the small calves 
to allow faster movement of the stolen livestock. They escaped with nearly 
200 head of cattle and horses. Militia failed to overtake the raiders. 
After several weeks of relative inactivity the Indians raided the Salina 
area on July 15. General Snow and the newly reorganized militia accepted the 
challenge and moved east into the mountains. In a valley east of Salina the 
militia surrounded the Indian rear guard and attacked. In this battle twelve 
Indians were killed and two escaped. The main body of Indians continued to 
push the livestock into the wilderness . General Snow divided his command , 
sending half back to guard the settlements and pursuing the Indians with the 
remainder. This pursuit was well described by Andrew Madson in his journal. 
Orange Seeley, N. P. Madsen, Alma Zabriskie, Myself and 
others from Mt. Pleasant were in Snow's company. As soon as 
possible we started on the trip trying to secure the cattle from the 
Indians. We camped the first night at the head of Salina Canyon. 
Then we went down the Canyon into a large valley (now Emery 
County). We did most of our traveling at night in order to avoid 
the attention of Indians. We crossed a large creek and journeyed 
over Buck Horn Flat where we were joined by Allred and his 
company who had taken the trail to the north, [colonel Allred had 
brought his men from Salina to take part in the pursuit .J We camped 
on the Price River that night and the following morning we moved on 
south and east to the Green River by daylight. We did not see any 
Indians but could see where they had driven the cattle through the 
river. Here the company stopped for breakfast. On the other side 
of the river we could see fresh wichiups made of green trees. The 
river was too high to ford. Dolph Bennett, John Sanders and Jens 
Larson were chosen as advance guards to swim across to investigate. 
John Sanders very nearly drowned, but was rescued by Bennett. 
The advance men upon reaching the other shore found a great many 
fresh tracks ot the Indians, and called back to tell their find. After 
scouting about a short time they returned across the river to the 
balance of the company. Most of the company wanted to follow the 
tracks, but upon taking inventory of their supplies, which now con-
sisted of cracker crumbs only, the officers decided on account of 
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the jaded condition of the horses and the lack of supplies, to give 
up the chase and return home . Years later, Chief Jake Arropine 
told that the Indians were hiding among the bushes and trees and 
could easily have shot and killed the advance men and others had 
they wanted to ; when asked why they had not done so , he said 
that they had intended to fire when all the men were across or 
crossing and had gotten into the river , "then the water would have 
been red." We started homeward across the mountain, over rough 
trails, through canyons and deep washes, by way of the place called 
"Hole in the Rocks . " We were two days and a half without food, 
with the exception of a spoonful of cracker crumbs dished out to 
each man for a meal. While we saw no Indians, we were interupted 
now and again by wild beasts of the mountain. In Rock Canyon, on 
the other side of the mountain, we were met by a party from home 
who brought provisions to us, they, in attempting to reach us had 
been delayed by losing their way in the mountains . There was much 
rejoicing the following morning when we pitched our camp in Ephriam, 
having been gone about two weeks. 32 
After returning to Mt. Pleasant the men were feted and rested. Those 
chosen for the standing army were then stationed in a hay field outside of town 
where they could march at a moment's notice. 
Activities again subsided until about the middle of September when 
General Snow received word from Colonel Allred that the Indians intended to 
attack Circleville. General Snow and a company moved south to prevent the 
expected attack. On the 21st of September while they were camped near 
Fish Lake , General Snow and Colonel John I vie were fired on. In a pitched 
battle fourteen Indians were killed and three militia were wounded, including 
General Snow, who suffered a serious shoulder wound in the first exchange 
of fire. During the night the militia moved to Grass Valley where they camped, 
and the next day returned home. 33 
32 Longdorf, p. 101. 
33Gottfredson, p . 140. 
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In March of 1866, Chief Kanosh sent word to the authorities at 
Mt. Pleasant that a large party of Indians was camped in. the Nephi hills 
between the towns of Nephi and Mt. Pleasant. With the help of Chief Kanosh 's 
son, Jake, the Indians were surrounded and all but one were captured by the 
militia. The one refused to surrender and was killed. Jake then identified the 
hostile Indians who were arrested. The remainder of the group was considered 
friendly and released. 
With Jake's testimony four of the hostile Indians were condemned to 
death, and the rest ordered to jail. A detail of militia carried out the exe-
cutions. 
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One of the Indians sent to jail was Sanpitch, a chief who had broken 
the reservation treaty that was signed in Spanish Fork in June of 1865 . 
Chief Sanpitch and seven companions were able to break jail March 14, 
1866, and escape. The possee which pursued Sanpitch cornered him in Birch 
Canyon between Fountain Green and Moroni on March 18. He refused to 
surrender and was killed. Three of the Indians were killed while trying to 
get out of Mt. Pleasant. General Snow killed one with the stock of his gun 
as he was jumped at night. The four who escaped were trailed into the 
mountains between Sanpete and Juab Valleys where they were killed. 35 
The largest Indian raid of the war occurred Sunday, June 11, 1866. 
Striking Round Valley (Scipio) about noon with an estimated 200 warriors 
34
neseret News, September 15 , 1934. 
35Gottfredson, p. 188. 
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Black Hawk killed two men and swept from three to five hundred head of live-
stock into the hills. 36 
When General Pace, who was then in central Utah with a military 
command, received the news of the raid he assumed the Indians would cross 
the Sevier River at Gravelly Ford near Salina. While the militia was moving 
toward the ford a dust cloud was seen approaching from the west. Assuming 
the dust to be the Indians , the General knew he had to beat them to the crossing 
or the stock would be lost. The Indians had prepared their own ambush at the 
ford and fired on the approaching militia . The militia outnumbered the ambushers 
and were able to drive them off, only to be repulsed by more Indians coming up 
from the arriving stock. While some of the Indians pushed the stock across the 
ford and into the mountains the rest engaged the militia. For several hours, 
the force of seventy-five to eighty Indians and the militia fought on even terms. 
The Indians were able to surround the militia who retreated to the top of a 
small hill. 
A militiaman named James E . Snow was able to get a shot at an Indian 
behind a horse. Guessing that he could shoot through the horse and hit the 
Indian, he tried. At his shot, Snow reported , both horse and Indian fell. The 
Indian was ab le to escape with the help of two companions . 37 It was not known 
at the time but this wounded Indian was none other than Black Hawk, who was to 
36Gibbs, p. 484. 
37 Gottfredson, p . 205. 
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mffer from this wound the rest of his life. He was not able to lead the a ttacks 
ute r this date and became less important. 
Just as the battle seemed to turn in favor of the militia a cloud of 
cust was observed in the west. Thinking tha t more of the raiding Indians 
vere approaching and knowing his men were about out of ammunition, General 
l'ace and his officers decided to break off the action and retire. This they did, 
mlowing the Indians to escape with all o f their booty . The dust c loud was a 
t ·oop of seventy cavalry from Fillmore under the command of Captain J ames 
C. Owens. Before the troops could be reorganized and ammunition distributed 
tte Indi ans were so far away immediate pursuit was ineffec tive . 
Black Hawk's raid on Round Va lley so unnerved its population that they 
blcame doubly cautious, thus giving the Indians the chance to make good their 
eJcape. The first messenger from the area was not allowed to leave until 
a'ter 10 p. m. to insure his safety. 38 
Shortly after the departure of the messenger , Captain Owens had his 
nen gathered and prepared to pursue the Indians. The men were intstructed 
t• take bread and fried meat for food because no fires would be allowed , nor 
tine given to prepare food. 
The Fillmore militia departed after dark in a pouring rain the night 
o June 11 , 1866. Following the trail proved to be easy because of the Indian 
htbi t of killing the slower or hard to manage animals. 39 After fording at 
38Gibbs , p . 485. 
39Ibid. , p. 481. 
least one stream in flood, and riding all night, much of it in rain, Captain 
Owens should be forgiven of his classic statement of "What the Hell," when 
he saw General Pace and his men retreating at Gravelly Ford. The only 
casualty to be seen on the Gravelly Ford battle ground was the imported 
stallion of James Ivie that Black Hawk had stolen in Round Valley the day 
before. 40 
The stage was now set for one of the largest and most prolonged 
a ttempts of the war to punish the Indians . Colonel H. C. Kimball and his 
cavalry from Fountain Green joined with General Snow and Captain Owens, 
36 
who were near Salina the next day, to start pursuit. The militia moved up 
Salina Canyon. At noon they came upon the place where the Indians had camped 
the night before. Here General Snow, over the protest of some younger offi-
cers, decided that without heavy reinforcements a chase would be futile and 
withdrew. 
Arriving back h't Gunnison, General Snow found General Daniel H. 
Wells, the Commander of the Territorial Militia who had come from Salt Lake 
to assume command of the region. A company of Cavalry under command of 
Colonel John R. Winder, and one of infantry under command of Major William 
W. Casper were assigned to General Snow's command. General Wells ordered 
immediate pursuit to try and recover the stock. The militia returned through 
Salina into the canyons of Eastern Utah. They found later that the first pursuit 
40Ibid. , p. 488. 
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lad put them within twelve miles of the stolen stock. The second expedition 
vas in the hi lls three days when retreat was ordered . Both men and anaimals 
mffered greatly from thirst in the rough arid country. Again the Indians were 
mccessful. This raid, even though Black Hawk was wounded, could not have 
lut provided inspiration for others . 
Shortly after the Gravelly Ford battle Captain Albert Peter Dewey with 
f company of Infantry were ordered to establish a camp in Thistle Valley. 
Captain Dewey had scouts in the nearby hills to warn of Indian attack. Two 
cf the scouts saw Indians and attempted to warn the camp. Before reaching 
atfety one of them was wounded but he was helped into camp before dying. 
Pnother set of scouts, seeing the Indians between themselves and the camp, 
vent to nearby Fairview for help. 
Captain Dewey had fortified his camp with baggage wagons and dead 
t:ees from the area. The camp, however , was located in a grove of Juniper 
t;ees which gave protection to the attackers . 
The scouts going to Fairview met Colonel John !vie and a group of 
nili tia who were guarding a herd of cattle. Colonel !vie and his men arrived 
a the scene in time to rescue Captain Dewey and his men from defeat. It 
WlS estimated that there were over 100 Indians compared to 37 militia. 41 
The last battle between Indians and Militia came in the northern part 
o· the war area. Indians struck the Spanish Fork pastures on June 26, 1866, 
41
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stealing about 50 horses and 20 head of cattle. The Springville Militi a, under 
the command of Colonel William Creer, followed the raiders into Mapleton 
Canyon. After pursuing them up the canyon and ove r the divide into Diamond 
Canyon, Colonel Creer's men caught and began firing on the Indians who 
r e turned fire . 
The Indians, thinking they could defeat the militia , began an attack of 
their own. Evidently the Indians were going to surround the militi a but were 
surprised by another company of militia coming from Mapleton. After several 
hours of ineffective shooting Colonel Creer selected five of his best marksmen 
and had them concentrate the fire on the War Chief, an estimated 800 yards 
away. On the fifth volley the Chief was seen to fall from his horse. With the 
Chief e ither dead or \\Qunded the Indians retreated behind the hill. They were 
a llowed to escape but left behind a ll of the sto len livestock. 42 This was the 
first time the militia had r ecovered a ll livestock stolen in any one raid. 
The War in the South 
The war in Southern Utah, while a part of the general hostilities, was 
different. There were fewer ranches and the people more isolated than in the 
central region. The Navaho raided both cattle and horse herds but was also 
s uccessful in stealing sheep. 
42John R . Winder , Journal, Military Records , Territoria l Militia--
Nauvoo Legion correspondence, 1857-1877. Utah State Archives, box 8. 
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Most of the raids were by small bands of Navaho. There were some 
Piedes involved but it appears that they were few in number. Most of the 
local Indians remained loyal to the settlers and often served as guides or 
scouts for the militia. There is at least one account of livestock being 
returned by Piedes after it had been stolen by the Navaho. 
Because of the difficult terrain and lack of water in much of Southern 
Utah the herds tended to be smaller. It was much more difficult to move live-
stock through the wilderness because of the deep canyons and sheer ledges. 
Because of this the militia actions were much more successful than they were 
in other areas. There were no raids in which 100 Indians got away with two 
or three hundred head of livestock. 
General Erastus Snow, the commander of the Iron District, took 
positive action and was credited with limiting the scope of the war. After the 
first travelers were killed by Indians, travel was restricted to groups large 
enough to defend themselves . Martial law was declared and every available 
man was mustered into the militia. 43 General Snow had scouting patrols 
in the hills most of the time and attempted to prevent attacks. Most ranches 
were ordered abandoned early and were not reocuppied until the threat was 
over. General Snow promoted effective leaders who were largely responsible 
for the positive action he advocated. 
43 Angus M. Woodbury, "A History of Southern Utah and Its Parks," 
Utah Historical Quarterly, XII (July-October, 1944), 170. 
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The major offensive action of the war was an attempt to locate the 
trails used by Indians in crossing the Colorado River. This expedition was in 
the hills 60 days during August and September of 1866, and covered an esti-
mated 460 miles . 
A second large expedition was sent to attempt the recovery of stolen 
livestock in February of 1869. This company returned home 16 days later 
after covering 384 miles and seeing neither Indian or livestock. 44 
General Snow kept guards at the important river crossings and 
mountain passes. This was instrumental in limiting the scope of the war but 
was not accomplished without problems and dependence on Indian allies. 
"Fort Kanab, November 5, 1869. 
"Pres E. Snow. 
"We have not sufficient men to guard the fort . Ten Indian 
warriors is all we have to depend on. We want at least ten good 
men we ll armed and if we had of had we wo uld of prevented all 
of this raiding. We have two horses fit for service and twelve 
head which are a detriment to us. As provisions we have toler-
able being at home here, but if we were to go out we would have 
nothing but bread to take with us. You will see from the above 
that we are not situated to guard the two passes. We s hall start 
ten Indians and one of our men tomorrow morning for the north 
trail, we will be left with two men with a few old sick and crippled 
Indians . We will do the best we can until help comes. We should 
have some tobacco for the Indians. 
"s/T. C. Judd"
45 
There were indications that the Navaho was getting he lp from other than 
Indian allies. E. G. Wooley, an officer in the militia , reported after one 
44Edwin G. Wooley, Journal, Microfilm, Utah Historical Society . 
45Territorial Militia--Nauvoo Legion corr espondence, 1869-1875, 
Utah State Archives, box 7. 
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;krimish tha t the rifle reports sounded like that of Spencers . The Spencer 
· ifle was then one of the most modern on the market. 46 Another report indi-
'ated that white men were involved in some actions . 
"S. George, March 8, 1869. 
' 'Indians report to J. Bamblin that a large number of Navahos 
a r e south on the other side of the Colorado--said to be aided by 
whitemen and well supplied with guns and ammunitions--have 
whipped the small tribes south of the Colorado and threatened to 
prey upon us--no news ye t from Captain Copelan--no sign in this 
ne ighborhood. 
"s / He nry Ryring Adjt."47 
~here are no reports of white men being ide ntified by the militia. 
The Navaho raids diminished gradua lly and by 1871 the th reat was 
' irtually e liminated . Military vigilance and treaties concluded by the Govern-
nent in New Mexico r emoved the threat. The southern part of the ter ritory 
<arne out of the war with less than one-fourth the losses of central Utah. 
Heber Valley 
Heber Valley settlers on the northern fringe of the war zone and wes t 
cf the new reservation expected Indian troubles. While Indian actions in their 
:rea were few they upset the lives of the settlers for part of three years. In 
! pril of 1866, as part of the terri to rial preparation plan, orders were issued 
ty General Wells to reorgani ze and prepare the militia unit for possible trouble. 
46Edwin G. Wooley, Journal. 
47 Territorial Militia--Nauvoo Legion correspondence , 1869-1875, 
Uah State Archives, box 7. 
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Colonel Robert T. Burton was sent from Salt Lake City to direc t prepar a tions. 
The first order of business was to place guards in the most used 
mountain passes. Large corrals wer e cons tructed to protect the lives tock 
and the militia reorganized. Three companies of cavalry were organized and 
one of Home Guard . The militia units were given two days of tr ai ning and 
declared ready. Settlers on scattered farms were moved into Heber for the 
du ration. 
The Indians was ted little time in testing the newly organi zed militia . 
Near the middle of May, Indians were s uccess ful in s teal ing forty to fifty 
horses. The Hebe r Militia were no more s uccessful than their counterparts 
e lsewher e. 
Indians raided the va lley in July but lost the stolen livestoc k and their 
own horses in getting away. Three horse stealing raids in August c limaxed 
hostilities for the year. In the spring of 1867 the valley leaders we r e 
successful in halting Indi an problems. As described by John Crook: 
The spring of 1867 was late and the snow deep in the hills. We 
put out our guards , but no Indians troubled us until the middle of 
July . A special scout, John Cummings who had on a certain 
occasion found in a s ide canyon an Indian who had skinned an ox. 
Mr. Cummings covered the Indian with his rifle and drove him 
ahead of him to Heber City where he was kept under guard three 
days. A court marshall decided to write a note to Chief Tabby , 
advising him to keep his Indi ans at home , and also asking T abby 
to come over and m ake peace wi th us. We gave the note to the 
Indian and told him to go immedia tely to the reservation, give 
the note to Chief Tabby like a good Indian . Two guards went with 
him to see him over the ridge . 
About a month later, or about the 15th or 20th of August 
Chief Tabby with his whole tribe , squaws, papooses and peaceable 
Indians that he could control came he r e. The Chief said that he 
c ould not control those of his Indians who were with Black Hawk. 
We had a bowery in which we he ld summer meetings, and in this 
we set large tables , and the ladies furnished a good picnic for 
the Indians. An ox was killed and roasted, and the Indians filled 
up good ; the pipe of peace was passed around, and the Indians 
after stopping a few days returned home with a few good presents. 
On leaving our valley these Indians stole thirty of our horses. 48 
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With the visit from Chief Tabby , Indian problems ended for the area. 
~he most significant action of Heber Valley Militia units occurred when they 
!e rved as escorts to Indian Supreintendent F. H. Head , as he made journeys 
into the Uintah Basin in May and June of 1866 seeking peace . 
The people of Utah took various measures of defense at the start of 
he war. One method involved the construction of several forts. Black Hawk 
rod his followers in the hit and run attacks did not tend to bother large groups 
cf people. Most forts did not have a shot fired from them . Some, however, 
dd se rve as holding corrals for livestock. 
Fort Deseret, the first to be completed , was located about one mile 
routh of present day Fillmore. Under direction of Apostle Amasa Lyman and 
Iishop Thomas Callister, construction was started in June of 1865. The fort 
cwered about two acres . The walls of the fort were eighteen inches thick and 
t•n feet high, made of adobe . The foundations were three and one-half feet 
t1ick and made of lava rock. There were bastions in two corners to cover 
48John Crook, "Autobiography," Utah Historical Society , Salt Lake City, 
Uah. (Typewritten.) 
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the surrounding area, and gun slits for rifles along the walls . The adobe 
used in the fort was made from clay and straw. Ninety-eight men divided 
into two companies finished the fort on the 25th of July. Fort Desere t was 
never actually used, but it did figure in the war.49 In the spring of 1866 Black 
Hawk and seventy-two warriors appeared near Fillmore. 50 When asked if they 
wanted food they insinuated they could take all the food they wanted. The dis-
cussion was held within sight of the finished fort . It was felt that seeing the 
prepardness of the citizens influenced the Indians to change their minds about 
the raid . After spending the night in the area, Black Hawk and his men left 
peaceably. A military detachment assigned to keep them under surveillance 
reported they left without trouble . The visit proved to be a good scouting 
51 
trip, however, for the raid on June 11 . Part of the walls of Fort Desere t 
still stand. 
Fort Sanford was constructed be tween Circleville and Panguitch to 
offer protection to the se ttle me nts of the upper Sevier River. The fort was 
a stockade located about seven miles north of Panguitch near Louder's Spring. 
It was built under the direction of Captain Silas Sanford Smith in Mar c h, 1866 , 
by a detachment of seventy-six men, from Beaver and Iron Counties. 52 Fort 
49Henry Savage, "Biography," Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (Typewritten.) 
50Robert L. Ashby, Family History of Thomas Waters Cropper. 
Brigham Young 'University , Provo, Utah. p . 33 . 
51Ibid. 
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carrie Allen, History of Circleville (Richfield , Utah: Richfield 
Re~per Press, 1966), p. 5. See also,Woodbury , p. 169 . 
45 
Sanford was occupied at various periods by troops from Beaver, Para won, 
Circleville and Panguitch. It was evacuated November 30, 1866. 
It was decided in 1866 to build a fort in the town of Mt. Pleasant. 
':'he fort was started June 4, and completed June 19 , 1867 . The walls enclosed 
~bout five acres and were made of rock and adobe. 53 The major purpose of 
the fort it appears was to serve as a corral for cattle. Nothing indicates the 
fort was ever used for protection against Indians . 
Fort Pierce, the southern most fort in Utah, was constructed during 
the fall of 1866. Fort Pierce was named for Colonel J. D. L. Pierce, a 
frontier missionary, soldier and rancher. The fort was located at the head of 
\V'arner Valley, which is situated about halfway between St. George and Kanab, 
j1st north of the Arizona state line. The Fort Pierce region was a major 
cattle grazing area in and around Short Creed (Colorado City, Arizona). The 
f>rt was built on the edge of Fort Pierce Wash, overlooking a large cattle 
corral built in the wash. It was possible for militia inside the fort to defend 
tle corral from its protection. 54 The fort was deemed necessary for the 
prot ection of the livestock in the area. 
The last fort to be constructed during the war was at Pipe Springs. 
1hat area was one of the better grazing regions of Northern Arizona and was 
U3ed as a staging area for the militia throughout the conflict. The fort was 
53 Longdorf , p. 110. 
54 Lorenzo H. Re id , Dixie of the Deseret (Salt Lake City, Utah: Wheel-
\\.right Lithographing Co., 1964) , p. 164. 
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Pipe Springs 
Figure 1. Forts used in the Black Hawk War. (Marked with*) 
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built of native red sandstone and originally planned for 152 x 66 feet . The 
completed fort measured 60 x 40 feet. 
Located within its walls was a spring, so water was insured in case of 
attack. The fort was completed in 1872 with the exception of the doors . 55 
Windsor Castle, as the fort became known, still stands, today it is a historical 
monument supervised by the National Park Service. The fort was never used 
for protection from Indians. 
Peace Attempts 
On accepting the treaty of June 1865 the Ute Indians agreed to move to 
the Uintah Basin within one year. They were to give up title to lands in Utah 
Valley and Sanpete County. The Indians also agreed that they would live in 
peace and not steal from, or molest other whites . They promised that they 
would not go to war with other tribes except in self defense. The Indians 
were to co-operate with the Indian Department in developing farms , building 
homes and educating their children. 
The United States Indian Department promised to give them protection 
from whites and other Indians. The Government was to Jay out farms, build 
lumber and grist mills, schools, and houses. Annuities were to be paid to the 
principal chiefs and to the tribes in the amount of $25, 000 annually for the first 
ten years, $20, 000 for the next twenty years and $15,000 for the next thirty 
55Robert W. Olson Jr., "Windsor Castle, Mormon Frontier Fort at 
Pipe Springs," utah Historical Quarterly, XXXIV, No. 3 (Summer, 1966), 
225. 
years . The Indians were given permission to hunt , dig roots , and gather 
berries in all unoccupied areas. They were a llowed to fish in the ir usua l 
places and to build drying houses. 56 This treaty was never ratified by the 
Senate and, therefore , never became effec tive. 
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Until March of 1866, Colone l Irish attempted to establish peace. In 
that month he was replaced as Superinte ndent of Indian Affairs by Colonel 
Franklin H. Head. Colone l Irish resigned because of business and family 
pressures and returned East. Colonel Head had been the Secretary to 
Governor Durkes. The new Indian Agent began immediate ly to secure peace 
in the territory. In a letter dated March 31, 1866, to Indian Commissioner 
D. N. Cooley in Washington , Head said, "It is absolutely necessary to 
provide food and clothing for the Indians near Nephi." He also stated the 
need for seed grain. He said tha t the Indians had been promised cattle and 
that they would have trouble moving the Indians to the reservation without the 
stock. 57 He attempted to get Federal he lp from the War Departme nt . While 
waiting for information from General Dodge, Colonel Head and Governor 
Durkes paid a visit to the Indian farm at Corn Creek , Millar County on June 
21. At Corn Creek, Colonel Head obtained new assurances from Chief Kanosh 
that the Piute Indians would abide the treaty agreements. 
While waiting for a reply from the commissioner, Head asked for 
Indians who would seek out Black Hawk and get him to agree to meet with him, 
56Deseret News , June 14 , 1865. 
57 Indian Affairs Reports, March 31, 1866. 
to discuss a settlement. Head expressed the thought that unless he could 
pacify Black Hawk and the other Indians they would all unite in the warfare. 
Colonel Head also paid a visit to the Uintah Basin to visit Indians that had 
moved there according to the treaty of 1865. 
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Some attempts were made by Colonel Head to carry out the provisions 
of the treaty. A sawmill was started in the Strawberry Valley in September 
of 1966. A group of men were sent from Springville to erect the mill and begin 
operations. The plan was to sell the lumber in Springville . Because of the 
lack of operating funds and unskilled personnel the sawmill never became 
operational. 58 
Colonel Head conferred with Chief Black Hawk in the Uintah Basin in 
the first part of August of 1867. Black Hawk at this time, assured Colonel 
Head that he was ready for a peace treaty. Black Hawk was still suffering 
from his wound and was not able to take an active part in the war. He 
requested that Colonel Head cut his hair as a token of his sincerity. Colonel 
Head clipped Black Hawk's braids, and supposedly Black Hawk's participation 
in the war was over. 
Black Hawk informed Colonel Head that some of the sub-chiefs were 
reluctant to stop the war, but that he would use his influence. It was a full 
year, however, before Colonel Head was to get a treaty from the sub-chiefs. 
In March of 1868, a meeting was held in Mt. Pleasant. Bishops of 
all towns in Sanpete County and Bishop Bryan of Nephi met with Chief Joe, and 
58Ibid. 
50 
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other Indian warriors. Chief Joe , a leading sub-chief of the Sanpete area 
had been one of the leading War Chiefs of the Piutes. Chief Joe spoke and 
expr essed his desire for peace. Other talks in the same vein were given 
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and finally a treaty was signed. The Indians promised to stop molesting the 
white settlers. As a token of good faith the Bishops had 1 , 000 pounds of flour 
sent to the Indian camp. This trea ty was broken on April 4th when settlers 
attempting to return to their homes in Richfield were attacked. 59 
On August 19 , 1868, Superintendent Head met in the Strawberry Lake 
a r ea with Black Hawk and several sub-chiefs. Prominent a t this time were 
Sowahpoint, Tameritz, and Shinavegin. Tamari tz has been called the most 
vicious of all Ute leaders. 60 With the a iling Black Hawk's influe nce, Superin-
te nde nt Head was able to conclude a peace treaty with the sub-chiefs agree ing 
to a cessation of hostilities . This treaty came about one year before peace 
actua lly came. 
59 Longdorf, p. 122. 
60Roberts, Comprehensive History of the Church, Vol. III, p. 153. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROBLEMS OF THE SETTLERS 
The Economy 
The economy of the settlements of Utah in 1865 was strictly agrarian. 
The most important farm crops were grains and grass hay . Lives tock con-
sis ting of horses , cattle, and sheep we r e the mainstays , furnishing , food , 
clothing, and power. Homes of the settlers were mostly log or adobe, and 
many of the settlers still lived in poor cabins or dugouts. 1 Sawmills , how-
ever , had been established in the mountains eas t of Manti to furnish lumber 
fo r homes and other buildings. 
New settlers coming into the terr itory were actively seeking new 
la nds for farming and grazing purposes. Few of the settlers were considered 
wealthy but some had small he rds of cattle or sheep. With transportation and 
communica tion dependent upon the horse, the settlers were mostly self-
sufficient. 
The war, while stimulating exploration of unknown areas delayed the 
settlement of these areas for years . Times remained hard throughout the 
war with the farmer often required to leave his crops in the field while he 
1Letter of Mary Larson Ahlstrom, cited in the Family History, 
Manti Public Library, Manti , Utah , p. 5 . 
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served with the militia. A militia unit moving through Circleville after the 
town had been abandoned pastured their horses in a grain field and remarked 
that the crops looked fine. Most of these crops were never harves ted . The 
loss of livestock, homes and crops severely hampered the economy of the 
frontier settlements. The effects were felt long after Indian problems had 
ceased. 
As Indian hostilities renewed in 1866 Brigham Young advised the 
people of the small settlements and scattered ranches to abandon them and 
move into communities of not less than 150 families. Before the end of the 
war 28 communities had been abandoned. The people left most of what they 
had worked years to build. Taking what livestock remained after the Indian 
raids the settlers moved into the settlements of Beaver, Manti, Ephraim and 
Mt. Pleasant. 
This left all of Utah bare of settlements between Manti on the north 
and St. George on the south The settlers taking just what they could load into 
wagons left homes and other buildings s tanding. Buildings not burned by 
Indians were used when the settlements were re-occupied. Crops were left 
in the fields, but some attempts were made to harvest them. The evacuation 
of Piute County left 700 acres of crops at Circleville plus those at Marysvale. 
In the fall a group of men from Beaver returned to Circleville and were able 
to harvest part of the grain. 
Evacuating the scattered settlements proved to be a problem. Many 
of the communities did not have enough teams left to pull their wagons. Teams 
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had to be sent from the large r settlements . Militia units had to be dispatched 
to guard the wagon trains. 
The only wagon train to have serious trouble with the Indians was the 
one evacuating Long Valley (Orderville). While ascending a hill the train was 
attacked by Indians. One man was wounded in the attack as the settlers fled 
into the trees leaving the Indians with the wagons and livestock. Several days 
later men returned to gather what remained. Later some of the livestock 
was returned by Piede Indians who had gotten them from the Navaho. 2 
Some of the evacuated towns were not reoccupied for years after the 
end of hostilities. Circleville was not reoccupied for eight years and only one 
family of the original settlers returned. 3 
Settlement Disruption 
The war for sparcely settled Utah was costly. The year 1865 ended 
with the loss of over 2, 000 head of cattle and horses from the central part of 
the territory. Between thirty and forty settlers had lost their lives as had an 
estimated forty Indians . The Indians also burned ranches and sawmills over 
a wide area of Central Utah. These problems were further aggravated by 
hundreds of acres of crops that could not be harvested . 
Through defensive measures the loss of life among the settle rs was 
reduced in 1866. Between twenty and twenty-five settlers and an estimated 
2 
Woodbury, p. 163 . 
3 Allen, p. 5. 
forty to fifty Indians were killed. The loss of livestock for Central Utah 
equaled the 1865 losses of 2, 000. 
With the successful actions of the militia in 1866 the livestock loss 
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for 1867 fell to below 1, 000 animals in Central Utah and was almost eliminated 
in succeeding years. The number killed in 1867 was between twenty and 
twenty-five, most were militia or travelers. 
In a letter to Colonel J. E. Toutelette, Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs in 1869, the people of Washington County claimed that they had been 
bothered for five years by Navaho who had killed some eight or ten citizens. 
They recounted losses of 500 horses and mules, 500 cattle, and 2, 500 head of 
sheep. 4 There are no sheep losses shown for the rest of the territory. The 
Navaho Indians in stealing sheep showed a different culture than the Ute . There 
are accounts of the Ute Indians riding into a flock of sheep and killing them for 
sport but there are no records of attempts to steal them. 
Besides the loss of livestock, the settlers were responsible for 
financing the war. As was shown above, the settlements assessed each settler 
an amount to help finance the militia. Larger communities took these losses 
and were responsible for the care of the refugees from abandoned areas . The 
development of the territory was delayed several years by the war and the 
serious losses the settlers sustained . 
4Reid, p. 165. 
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The Cost 
The dollars and cents cost of the war are significant. Costs figured 
for the war in Central Utah were broken down into militia, livestock losses , 
and settlement abandonment. Costs for militia services were set at 
$45,000 for 1865, $695,000 for 1866 and $450,000 for 1867 . Livestock losses 
were estimated at $75, 000 for 1865, $60,000 for 1866 and $35,000 for 1867. 
Estimated loss by breaking up and vacating settlements in Sanpete, Sevier, 
Kane, Summit, Wasatch and other counties was placed at $175, 000. Total 
expenses for the three years came to $1 , 535,000. Cost figures are not 
available for the activities in Southern Utah . 5 
In January of 1869 , General Clawson, the Adjutant-General of the 
Territory, submitted a claim of $1,121,037.38 to the Adjutant-Generals' 
office in Washington, D. C. 6 The amount claimed covered the war for the 
three years, and if costs for 1868 and Southern Utah had been added the amount 
would have been over two million dollars . 
The Government, in spite of repeated requests from Utah Officials, 
refused to appropriate the money. With one exception there seems to be no 
valid reason why claims were never paid. Acting Governor Edwin Higgins, 
in transmitting the claim to the Government, wrote, "I am unable to find from 
5Andrew Love Neff , History of Utah 1847-1869, edited and annotated 
by Leland Hargrave Creer (Salt Lake City, Utah Deseret News Press, 1940), 
p . 408 . 
6Ibid. 
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the records of the executive office that the militia was ever authorized by the 
Governor of the Territory or of the ir being employed in the Indi an War. " 7 
In 1869 the utah State Legislature appropriated $11,407 to r eimburse those 
who s tood the brunt of the expense of relief expeditions. Ten thous and dollars 
of this amount went to Sanpete and Sevier Counties. 8 
In later years pensions were secured for the Veterans of the Black 
Hawk War. Because of inadequate records many men could not prove they 
participated in the war and were not e ligible when pensions were granted. 
With the exception of the appropriation from the State Legislature the 
entire cost of the war was borne by the people of the a r ea. Most of the militia 
served without pay. 
Summary 
When one seeks to evaluate the results of the Utah Black Hawk War, 
many factors must be considered. 
On the positive side of the war one finds several benefits or results 
that te nded to aid early Utah. Perhaps the most important and least recog-
ni zed is the fact that the people of Southern and Central Utah were once again 
drawn together to meet a common challenge. Since the settling of the territory 
in 1847 only the Johnston's Army threat and the Walker War had provided an 
external stimulus to hold the pe ople together. One cannot ignore the Mormon 
7 Gustive 0. Larson , p. 158. 
8Ibid. 
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Church's influence in Utah, however, the threat of danger tended to unite the 
people in a more determined body. 
The second benefit may well have been the hurried completion of the 
Telegraph to the Central and Southern part of the State. The telegraph, in 
spite of threats, were rushed through Indian country without attack on con-
struction workers or damage to constructed lines. 
A third benefit may have been the exploration and discovery of favorable 
valleys for future settlement. Military units penetrated into the eastern half of 
the state from as far south as Kane and Garfield counties, to as far north and 
east as Uintah County. After the war, the retracted Mormon frontier in Southern 
Utah and the Arizona strip was soon reoccupied, and quickly extended into 
other areas. One community to result from military exploration was Escalante 
in 1887. 
On the negative side one finds the usual results. Although the seventy 
lives lost seems small when compared to those in other Indian wars, the figure, 
nevertheless, proved large for the sparsely populated area. The fact that 
these people were killed one or two at a time, and often in cruel or barbarious 
fashion, is indicative of the horror that accompanied this war. People of the 
settlements had to group together for every small chore. No one dared be 
alone very far from help. 
A second item may well be the cost. The Utah Territorial Congress 
peti tinned the United States Government unsuccessfully to defray the cost of 
compensation of services, supplies and transportation. The cost of this war 
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seems insignificant in the light of later war costs. The citizens who bore the 
brunt of this war were from small outly ing communities. Many of these 
communities were abandoned for the duration causing expenses to the people 
involved not counted in military campaigns. 
The disruption of normal growth and life for several years severly 
hampered the economic development of the region. This caused many of the 
settlements to remain on unsteady footing for many years after the war. Many 
new settlements were evacuated for the juration of the war, some were never 
resettled. Some communities had to be rebuilt before they could be reoccupied. 
Circleville was rebuilt as were several communities located in Sevier and 
Washington Counties. The need for every man to defend his home and family 
le t few find the time to explore or seek new home sites. 
The thousands of livestock lost to the Indians represented a major 
portion of the losses suffered . In a day where the horse was man's means of 
transportation and furnished the power for his agriculture the loss of a horse 
could not be estimated. Without the necessary horses the residents were 
unable to work their farms or to gather the cattle and sheep that had to be 
pastured in the mountains for feed. 
The lack of rapid communication severely hampered the war effort. 
The telegraph was extended to Manti in 1866, but by then the attacks were 
occurring far from Manti. The fact that the small communities of Sanpete, 
Washington, Sevier, Millard and Piute Counties did not have a telegraph 
decreased the value of it. Without r apid communication the settlements were 
alone. The Indians struck and were gone before help could be summoned. By 
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the time help arrived, the Indians were hours and miles away. There is 
nothing to indicate that other systems of communications were tried . It 
seems probable that signals of some type could have been used. Mirrors, 
smoke, or other signals had been used by the U.S. Military successfully by 
1865. The Manti Telegraph was used to get help from the north so it must 
be classified as successful. 
The war was largely fought by an amateur army. Its equipment was 
poor at bes t . Most of the office rs were elected and inexperienced . 
Letter excerpts s how some of the frustrations and fee lings expressed 
by two leading figures in the war. 
box 6. 
''Report to General D. H. Wells 
"Manti, Sept. 8th, 1868 
"There has nothing particularly transpired since the unfortunate 
occurrence at Warm Creek on the night of the 4th of which we tele-
graphed you on the fifth. I very much reject the necess ity of saying 
that this affair, as has been the case in almost every other disaster, 
was no more, no less than the result of carelessness . It seems 
imposs ible for some of us to learn or re me mber anything except 
throu sic sad experience. 
'Gen. W. B. Pace"
9 
"Letter to General D. H. We lls 
"March 1, 1867 
"Just over from Glenwood , Alma, and Richfield where I have 
been laboring for the past few days. I think with much profit. 
"In the military capacity the people there are like sheep without 
a shepherd. It is s aid tha t Colonel Smith has command of the forces 
in that county but he is a nonre sident , and for all advice and efficient 
a id to that people he might almost as well reside in St. Louis , Live r -
pool or London. As to live on the opposite side of the mountains with 
9Military Records , Territoria l Militia--Nauvoo Legion correspondence, 
whom they can have no communication by reason of snow and 
lack of roads . The people want him right with them in their 
midst, family, bag, and baggage . 
"They think they could fight better and are sure he could 
if residing with his family tn their midst. If fighting should be 
necessary. And, I am of the same opinion and knowing no 
source more proper to apply to than yourself for a word direct 
to him to repair with his family forthwith to any one of the three 
settlements on the Sevier . The people there are anxious not 
knowing how soon they may be attacked by Indians. 
"I may be mistaken in my impressions launching the design 
or 'Brother Smith' having charge of thst district, if so , I ask 
pardon, if not, I wish him urged over as soon as possible, each 
one of the three settlements has a copy of the President's last 
letter to me which I think will serve as a general order, and 
instructions to Colonel Smith with any additional instructions or 
orders that you may think proper to give him. 
"I remain Very Respectfully 
"Orson Hyde 10 
"Scipio , Round Valley" 
With conditions like these existing two or three years after the war 
had started, one cannot but wonder how or why the Indians decided to stop 
raiding. 
63 
Neither side in this war won a clear victory. The Indians only placed 
their relations with the settlers on a more difficult footing. The whites were 
able to move the Ute Indians onto the reservation but at an extremely high 
cost. The cost of the war, if counted in sacrifice, inconvenience and loss of 
life proved high. 
10Ibid. 
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